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AMENDMENT OF INDICTMENTS AND INFOBMATIONS
keynote by urging that the regulation of the mode of procedure under
indictments be allowed by legislation if the substance of constitutional
rights is unimpaired. They have advocated that unessential formalities
of the grand jury system be modified from time to time to meet changing
needs of the general welfare.4
0
To advocate this does not imply removing all distinctions between indict-
ments and informations, or removal of-the grand jury system altogether.
The grand jury, in fact, has a number of advantages. It has an unlimited
scope of ijhvestigatory powers. In addition, it provides a means of con-
trolling the activities of the prosecution, and were it abandoned, the danger
of placing too much discretion and power in the prosecuting attorney
would arise. It should be remembered that, even under the present system,
the grand jury may still be impanelled whenever needed even in those
states where the information is freely resorted to.4 ' In the face of the
common law approach to the problem, the only practical alternative to
freer amendment, open to prosecutors, is to abandon the indictment pro-
cedure altogether wherever, possible and resort, instead, to the information.
This course, which is often followed, would seem no less violative of any
constitutional rights than allowing indictments to be amended, subject
to the qualifications already discussed. Thus not only will the interests of time,
economy, and efficiency be served, but the advantages of the grand jury
method, rather than being destroyed, will actually be fostered.
The grand jury should be considered primarily a fact-finding body,
providing the facts on which the prosecution is to build its case. But it
should be recognized that the grand jury stage is a preliminary one, and
the court should be free to use its discretion to apply the finishing touches,
including authorization of any amendment which does not destroy the
defendant's constitutional safeguards. Courts might be well advised to
re-examine the bases of the historical doctrines, even as modified, and
attempt to achieve an acceptable compromise adapted to modern usage
while preserving historical values.
SHOULD THE FORCIBLE RECOVERY OF GAMBLING LOSSES
CONSTITUTE ROBBERY?
Howard Joseph
One of the most striking instances of leniency in robbery prosecutions is
exhibited when a loser at gambling retakes his losses forcibly. As a general
rule most courts refuse to view this as an act of robbery.' Remaining within
the usual robbery formula, they have avoided conviction by emphasizing the
requirement that a specific intent to steal be present as an essential element
of the crime. While the rule indicates the difficulty of securing robbery con-
victions in these cases, it has not been applied when the accused recovered
40. Com. v. Snow, 269 Mass. 598, 606, 169N.E. 542, 545 (1930).
41. The CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE (1930) provides, in §113, that "All offenses here-
tofore required to be prosecuted by indictment may be prosecuted either by indictment or
information," and in §114 that "No grand jury shall be summoned . . . except upon the
order of a judge thereof when in his opinion the public interest so demands, except that a
grand jury shall be summoned at least once a year in each county."
1. People v. Rosen, 11 Cal. 2d 147, 78 P. 2d 727 (1938) ; People v. Hughes, 11 Utah 100,
39 P. 492 (1895) ; State v. Price, 38 Utah 149, 219 P. 1049 (1923).
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more than lie lost,2 and might be similarly ignored if an unreasonable time
elapsed before the recovery was attempted.3 In addition, the rule itself does
not bar the normal consequences of the accompanying assault.4
The intent requirement has been used to justify the desired result in every
case,5 whether resulting in conviction or acquittal; the presence or absence
of this necessary factor depends ol the view taken as to the ownership of the
money lost. The courts taking the more liberal view hold that the loser at
gambling does not lose title to his money, concluding that if he merely retakes
his own property he cannot have the intent to steal. Only the Texas courts,
holding that title passes to the winner in every case where the wining was
not fraudulent, have departed from the usual result to decide that conviction
for robbery should follow.6
Three closely related title arguments have been adopted to decide intent.
People v. Rosen,7 representing the view of the California Supreme Court, was
decided within the framework of the theory that either party to a gambling
transaction comes into the court with "unclean hands" in an action against
the other involving the transaction." The court reasoned that since the winner
could not be adjudged the holder of title to the money, ownership was retained
by the loser, even though he parted with possession. It concluded that the
winner himself could not be a complaining witness against the loser on a
robbery charge where the latter forcibly recovered the money. When the
Supreme Court of Mlichigan considered the problem in People v. Henry,9 it
held that since Michigan has a recovery statute allowing a right of replevin
for the recovery of losses, the loser must be considered the legal owner of the
money. Under either view the courts concede the presence of constructive
intent from the presence of a taking in excess of the loss, the question of title
becoming non-essential in such a case.'0
The Texas courts supplied the third title argument in such cases as Carrol v.
2. People v. Lain, 134 P. 2d 284 (Cal. App. 1943).
3. See People v. Rosen, 11 Cal. 2d 147, 152, 78 P. 2d 727, 729 (1938) (During several
months prior to the date of the offense defendant had lost money gambling, but while he
recovered $198 by force he had lost only $55 the same night. The Court said, "It was for
the jury to determine whether the defendant's expressed intent to get his own money back
was bona fide, or because of remoteness from the time of loss . . . it was merely a pretext
for an act of robbery).
4. People v. Rosen, 11 Cal. 2d 147, 151, 78 P. 2d 727, 729 (1928) "This view neither
condones nor invites the commission of crime inasmuch as the accused must pay the penalty
for the violation of any applicable penal law."
5. "In every crime or public offense there must exist a union, or joint operation of act
and intent . . ." Cal. Penal Code (Deering 1941) §20. The Illinois courts hold that intent
is presumed from the use of a dangerous weapon, and need not be proved. People v.
Emerling,-341 II. 424, 173 N.E. 474 (1930).
6. Livingston v. State, 214 S.W. 2d 119 (Tex. Crim. App. 1948); Carroll v. State, 57
S.W. 99 (Tex. Crim. App. 1900).
7. 11 Cal. 2d 147, 78 P. 2d 727 (1938).
8. As the court stated in the Rosen case, "It is the law in this state that certain games
of chance are illegal; that the winner gains no title to the property at stake, nor any right
to possession thereof; and that the participants have no standing in a court of law or
equity." 11 Cal. 2d 147, 150 (1938). Simply expressed, "The principle of public policy is
this: . . . no court will lend its aid to a man who founds his cause of action on an immoral
or illegal act . . ." 5 WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS 4561 (1937).
9. 202 Mich. 450, 168 N.W. 534 (1918) (Actually a larceny conviction, although an
armed assault was committed; the principle advocated is not altered by this fact).
10. People v. Lain, 134 P. 2d 284 (Cal. App. 1943) ; Gant v. State, 115 Ga. 205, 41 S.E.
698 (1902); Cf. People v. Farrell, 31 Cal. 576 (1867), where the court explains that if the
motive or intent assigned is inconsistent with the external circumstances it must be discarded
as false.
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State," when they interpreted the doctrine of unclean hands to mean that the
parties would be left in status quo in a civil suit for the losses. They thus
implied that a court would neither approve nor disapprove the condition of
the parties. Whereas the California court said that the winner can not get
title to the money, the Texas courts added that the loser is not in any better
position; the result is that title remains- in the winner simply because he has
possession. When the winning was fraudulent, the Texas courts reason that
since the winner himself is subject to conviction for theft he does not gain
control of the money.' 2
Because the California and Texas views use the same rule of law with con-
trary results, it would seem that one of them is applying it wrongly. This,
however, is unimportant, since it would seem that the doctrine of "unclean
hands" has been erroneously appropriated from equity. This doctrine has
been used by equity where one party to an illegal undertaking seeks to obtain
an accounting from his partner, the court refusing to lend its aid in such a
situation,'3 the theory being that as the complainant is equally as guilty as
the defendant he should be denied satisfaction from his co-conspirator. It
would seem then that the applicability of this doctrine is limited to deciding
rights between the parties to an illegal act. Hence, without the presence of
recovery statutes, courts may be justified in saying that a civil suit for the
gambling losses would be of no avail. In robbery cases, however, the state
is the real plaintiff, and bears no relationship to either party beyond its police
power over them. Presumably its interest in the public peace is greater than
the interests of the parties and their rights in a civil suit; and, since the state
summons the victim of the taking to appear in its behalf, it is frivolous to
suppose that the latter has no right to be a complaining witness. Certainly
the state is not a party to the illegal transaction. An added fallacy in the
reasoning of the California and Texas courts is the fact that while both assert
the impossibility of adjudicating the question of title as between the parties,
they themselves hold it to be in the loser and winner, respectively.
14
The Michigan theory, based on the presence of a recovery statute, fails to
consider the statute's true nature. The Illinois version of a recovery statute,
for instance, provides that anyone can sue the winner for the amount lost after
six months have elapsed without suit by the loser. Treble damages are
awarded.' 5  The Michigan statute itself makes it a misdemeanor for the loser
not to bring such an action.' 6 Neither statute presents any indication that
11. 57 S.W. 99 (Tex. Crim. App. 1900).
12. Temple v. State, 215 S.W. 965 (Tex. Crim. App. 1900) (Use of marked cards by the
winner) ; Fisher v. State, 277 S.W. 386 (Tex. Crim. App. 1925). (Use of a short deck by
the winner.)
13. The classic example is Central Trust and Safe Deposit Co. v. Respass, 112 Ky. 606,
66 S.W. 421 (1902), where two betting agents came to court as plaintiff and defendant, and
the court refused to entertain a suit for an accounting of the profits made from various
gambling enterprises.
14. The California and Texas views may be further negatived, and the recovery statute
justified, by the statement of Lord Mansfield in Browning v. Morris, Cowper, 790, 792
(1778): "If a man pays a sum of money by way of a bribe he can never recover it in an
action, because both plaintiff and defendant are equally criminal. But where contracts or
transactions are prohibited by positive statute for the sake of protecting one set of men from
another set of men-the one, from their situation and condition, being liable to be oppressed
or imposed upon by the other-then the parties are not . . . equally guilty; and in
furtherance of these statutes the person injured, after the transaction is finished and com-
pleted, may bring his action and defeat the contract." Gambling between an expert and a
novice may fall into this qualification.
15. I1. Rev. Stat. (1949) c. 38 §330.
16. Mich. Stat. Anno. (1938) §28.547.
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title remains in the loser, nor any justification for their use in a criminal
action; they present the naked intent to penalize the winner for the purpose
of discouraging gambling. Thus a statutory replevin merely enlarges the scope
of the writ, without deciding the title question.
The Michigan court's interpretation is further discredited as an encourage-
ment of self-help. Since violent self-help is punishable without a statute
enabling peaceful recovery,' 7 there appears no justification for making a statu-
tory remedy the basis of a right to accomplish the identical thing by violence.
It might better be argued that one of its purposes is to eliminate forcible
recovery of gambling losses.
Actually the question of title need not bear any weight in these cases.
Although intent is an element that must be accounted for in any robbery case,
the fact of possession is a more accurate guide than title to the resolution
of the intent question. While the taker cannot be guilty of robbery when he
has clear title to the property,' 8 a taking may be robbery although the person
from whom the property is taken does not have good title to' it.19 For pur-
poses of determining intent, it is sufficient as against anyone not holding a
clear title that the person robbed have possession of the property. Since the
question of title cannot be decided, it is a simple matter, legalistically, to
say that intent is present.
The present views would be puzzling if it were not for the policy implica-
tions behind them. The majority rule seems to reflect the feeling that existing
laws demand leniency. Since gambling statutes and recovery statutes alike
have as at least one purpose, the protection of the unskilled gambler from
the professional, a decision in favor of the ill-equipped loser seems consistent
with legislative intent. However, coupled with the desire to follow the sup-
posed legislative policy may be a fear on the part of the court of invading the
legislative prerogative of stating public policy.20 While the view of the Texas
courts indicates that punishment for acts of violence takes precedence over
sympathy for the loser, they have not accomplished conviction by the shortest
route. Since the same result could be reached on the basis of possession alone,
their preoccupation with the doctrine of "unclean hands" must be for the
purpose of contradicting the majority view in theory as well as result.
One step toward properly accounting for the intent factor would be an
abandonment of the present title approach now followed by a majority of the
courts, regardless of policy considerations. Unless the type of taking in ques-
tion is specifically exempted from the robbery field by statute, it would seem
that in the absence of a better guide those courts now practicing leniency
should use possession alone to determine the question of title. Thus assuming
that the winner in a gambling transaction has title to his winnings, any effort
on the part of the loser to forcibly recover his losses would fall within the
robbery formula. While it is true that such a result might appear to deal
17. Cf. Curlee v. Scales, 200 N.C. 612, 158 S.E. 89 (1931). (Retaking of a check by a
party who thought he was entitled to its possession) ; Donnell v. Great Atlantic and Pacific
Tea Co., 229 Ala. 320, 156 So. 844 (1934) (Butcher slapping customer and retaking package
of meat on customer's refusal to pay 34 balance on purchase price).
18. 2 BURDICK, LAW OF CRIME 410 (1946).
19. State v. Montgomery, 181 Mo. 19, 79 S.W. 693 (1904) (Taking an employer's money
from his clerk); Com. v. Weiner, 255 Mass. 506, 152 N.E. 359 (1926) (Taking jewelry
from a jewelry store clerk) ; People v. Cabassa, 249 Mich. 543, 229 N.W. 442 (1930) (Tak-
ing money from a gas station attendant). Even stolen money on the person of a thief may
be the subject of robbery. 2 Burdick, Law of Crime (1946) 411.
20. It may also be the fear of those criminally inclined passing off robbery as recovery
of gambling losses. See People v. Rosen, 11 Cal. 2d 147, 153, 78 P. 2d 727, 730 (1938)
(Dissenting).
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